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Members of a group often come to remember their 
past similarly. Since Halbwachs (1980) first described the 
phenomenon, it has garnered a great deal of attention, in 
large part because it bears critically on issues of national 
identity and ethnic conflict, as well as group cohesion 
and family stability (Fentress & Wickham, 1992; Olick 
& Robbins, 1998). Although collective memories have 
been studied mainly by sociologists, who have focused 
on the role of powerful institutions in shaping the content 
of collective memories, in a limited body of work a psy-
chological perspective has been adopted (see Bangerter, 
von Cranach, & Arn, 1997; Bar-Tal, 2000; Echterhoff 
& Saar, 2002; Gladwell, 2002; Middleton & Edwards, 
1990; Pasupathi, 2001; Pennebaker, Paez, & Rime, 1997; 
Weldon, 2001; Wertsch, 2002). One line of such research 
has followed Sherif ’s (1966) work on social norms and 
Sperber’s (1996) discussion of the epidemiology of beliefs 
and has treated collective memories as shared individual 
memories (see also Hirst & Manier, 1996; Olick, 1999). 
From this perspective, both core and central elements and 
the peripheral details of a story can constitute a collective 
memory if they are shared. (For instance, the song “Yan-
kee Doodle Dandy” may be considered part of American 
collective memory, but it is not central to most narratives 
one would tell about the United States.)
A critical question is how initially dissimilar individual 
(i.e., unshared) recollections become shared. In this ar-
ticle, we investigate the influence that conversations have 
on this process, examining what has been variously called 
collaborative remembering, conversational remembering, 
or group recounting. Psychologists have recently studied 
the processes underlying collaborative remembering (for 
reviews, see Pasupathi, 2001; Weldon, 2001). Our interest 
here is in the influence that collaborative remembering 
has on subsequent remembering and whether this influ-
ence leads to the formation (or further formation) of a col-
lective memory. We especially want to determine whether 
the proportion of shared recollections in the individual 
recollections following an act of conversational remem-
bering (shared postgroup recollections) is greater than the 
proportion found for recollections offered prior to the con-
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To test our hypothesis that conversations can contribute to the formation of collective memory, we 
asked participants to study stories and to recall them individually ( pregroup recollection), then as a 
group ( group recounting), and then once again individually ( postgroup recollection). One way that 
postgroup collective memories can be formed under these circumstances is if unshared pregroup rec-
ollections in the group recounting influences others’ postgroup recollections. In the present research, 
we explored (using tests of recall and recognition) whether the presence of a dominant narrator can 
facilitate the emergence of unshared pregroup recollections in a group recounting and whether this 
emergence is associated with changes in postgroup recollections. We argue that the formation of a 
collective memory through conversation is not inevitable but is limited by cognitive factors, such as 
conditions for social contagion, and by situational factors, such as the presence of a narrator.
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versation (shared pregroup recollections). It is well estab-
lished that unshared pregroup recollections surfacing in 
a group recounting can influence the postgroup recollec-
tions of other group members, either by reminding group 
members of forgotten information or by contaminating 
the subsequent recollections (the latter is referred to as 
social contagion; see Basden, Basden, & Henry, 2000; 
Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Loftus, 1993; McCann 
& Higgins, 1992; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Roediger, 
Meade, & Bergman, 2001; Todorov, Lalljee, & Hirst, 
2000; Walther et al., 2002; Weldon, 2001; Wilkes-Gibbs 
& Kim, 1991; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000).
It is less clear whether conversations are likely to pro-
duce an increase in the proportion of shared postgroup 
recollections. A conversation could induce group mem-
bers to forget some shared items, perhaps because of inter-
ference between their original memory and what was said 
in the conversation. Consequently, memories that were 
initially shared could come to be shared less as a result 
of the conversation. A conversation may not further the 
formation of a collective memory if this change occurs at 
a faster rate than does the transformation of unshared into 
shared items.
A few studies suggest that this alternative is unlikely. 
For instance, Weldon (2001) showed that postgroup recol-
lections across a group can converge onto core, or central, 
elements of a story. She did not, however, explicitly ex-
amine whether this convergence leads to a greater propor-
tion of shared elements. On the other hand, Wright et al. 
(2000; see also Gabbert et al., 2003) found that group 
recounting can lead to a greater number of shared post-
group recollections, but they focused only on one critical 
item and confined themselves to groups consisting of only 
2 individuals. Other studies have not assessed whether 
mnemonic convergence occurs outside the confines of the 
group recounting itself (e.g., Walther et al., 2002).
In the present study, we sought more definitive evidence 
that conversational remembering leads to the formation of 
a collective memory, now looking at groups of 4 and ex-
plicitly tracking the transformation of unshared pregroup 
recollections into shared postgroup recollections. More 
importantly, the conditions under which conversational re-
membering furthers the formation of a collective memory 
were examined. To the extent that reminding and social 
contagion underlie the formation of a collective memory, 
factors affecting these processes would be likely to influ-
ence the formation of a collective memory as well. When 
it comes to social contagion, the factors would include 
the presence of a warning about possible group influence 
(Meade & Roediger, 2002), the degree of difficulty group 
members experience in monitoring the source of a mem-
ory (Ozuru & Hirst, 2002), the size of the group (Walther 
et al., 2002), and the level of dissension within a group 
(Walther et al., 2002).
According to our definition of collective memory, there 
is another factor that also deserves attention—that is, that 
the formation of a collective memory should be influ-
enced by the introduction of unshared pregroup recollec-
tions into the group recounting. These unshared pregroup 
recollections could, in turn, lead to more shared postgroup 
recollections. Surprisingly, according to Stasser, Witten-
baum, and their colleagues, this condition for the forma-
tion of a collective memory should rarely be satisfied, 
inasmuch as conversational participants tend to discuss 
shared information, known to all participants, rather than 
unshared information, known only to one member (Wit-
tenbaum & Park, 2001; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996; cf. 
Tindale & Sheffey, 2002).
One exception to the Stasser–Wittenbaum principle is 
that when a group member is viewed as an expert, his or 
her unshared facts are more likely to emerge in a group dis-
cussion than when members are viewed as equals (Stasser, 
Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Stewart & Stasser, 1995; 
cf. Moreland, Argote, & Krishman, 1996; Wegner, 1986; 
Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991). A related exception is 
that even in conversations among peers, a person domi-
nating a discussion (the narrator) may tend to introduce 
his or her unshared pregroup recollections into group re-
countings. According to the model advanced by Stasser, 
Wittenbaum, and their colleagues, the more someone 
speaks, the more likely they should be to utter something 
unshared (Stasser & Titus, 1987). Our claim about narra-
tors follows from this postulate. It is also consistent with 
research showing that the presence of a narrator can have 
an important influence on the outcome of nonmnemonic 
tasks (Fay, Garrod, & Carletta, 2000).
Interestingly, narrators are often, but not always, pres-
ent in group recountings (Basden, Basden, Bryner, & 
Thomas, 1997; Basden et al., 2000; Basden, Reysen, & 
Basden, 2002; Hirst & Manier, 1996; Hirst, Manier, & 
Apetroaia, 1997; Manier, 1997; Manier, Pinner, & Hirst, 
1996; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). Consequently, if narra-
tors make the contribution we are proposing, conversations 
may be more likely to convert unshared pregroup recollec-
tion into shared postgroup recollection than the work of 
Stasser, Wittenbaum, and colleagues suggests. We, there-
fore, sought to determine whether a narrator introduces 
unshared pregroup recollections into group recountings 
and whether, in doing so, the narrator creates a condition 
conducive to the formation of a collective memory.
We also wanted to explore whether the presence of a 
narrator affects the content of postgroup collective memo-
ries. Postgroup collective memories should not consist of 
all the pregroup recollections of a group, in that group 
recountings rarely contain all of them (see Weldon, Blair, 
& Huebsch, 2000). Nor, as we will discuss below, would 
we expect postgroup collective memories to be a blend-
ing of pregroup individual memories, as when memories 
of yellow and blue blend to create a memory of green 
(Sherif, 1966; Wilkes-Gibbs & Kim, 1991). More plau-
sibly, postgroup collective memories may consist of the 
core and central elements of the original story, as Weldon 
(2001) asserted. This outcome would be expected to occur 
in the absence of a dominant narrator. In such a situation, 
mainly shared pregroup recollections would be expected 
to surface in the group recounting, and hence, the post-
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group collective memory should consist mainly of shared 
pregroup recollections. These shared elements should, 
in turn, be core and central elements, inasmuch as core 
and central elements are more likely to be remembered 
by multiple participants than are peripheral elements 
(Kintsch, 1976).
A postgroup collective memory could also consist of 
not just shared or core and central elements, but also the 
unshared pregroup recollections of one group member 
(Wright et al., 2000). This alternative is more likely to arise 
if a dominant narrator is present in the group recounting. 
In this case, unshared pregroup recollections would be 
likely to surface in a group recounting, and these, in turn, 
could be transformed into increased numbers of shared 
postgroup recollections.
We explored, then, whether the presence of a dominant 
narrator would affect the formation of a collective mem-
ory and its content, using, in Study 1, a recall test and, in 
Study 2, a recognition test. We focused on memories for 
directly experienced, nonhistorical events—specifically, 
the event of reading a story. In doing so, we avoided ter-
minological confusions in the literature, where the term 
collective memory refers, in different instances, to histori-
cal events, directly experienced events, or events learned 
about secondhand (Hirst & Manier, 2002). In pilot work 
in which we employed a professional actor to serve as the 
dominant narrator, participants reported that they felt that 
the conversations were stilted and awkward. Consequently, 
we allowed a dominant narrator to emerge naturally from 
spontaneous conversation, resulting in conversations that 
approximated naturally occurring conversations.
STUDY 1
We asked participants to study two stories and then 
to recall them, first individually, second as a group, and 
finally individually once again. In our data analyses, we 
carefully tracked the transformation of unshared pregroup 
individual recollections into shared postgroup individual 
recollections.
Method
Participants. We tested 24 Romanian families. We examined 
families because we expected that family members would naturally 
adopt conversational roles. As for the use of Romanian participants, 
three of the authors were spending time in Romania, with one being 
a native speaker of Romanian. The families were recruited through 
advertising in local newspapers. Each family was paid for its par-
ticipation. Each family consisted of two parents and two adolescent 
children. Fifteen families had a girl and a boy, 6 families had two 
boys, and 3 families had two girls. The average age for the parents 
was 46 years; the children’s average age was 18 years (ranging from 
14 to 25).
Stimulus Materials. We selected two short stories that were not 
familiar to any of the participants. The first story was a 1,053-word 
translation of Jerome K. Jerome’s (1900) “Three Men on the Bum-
mel,” which describes the author’s travels through Germany. The 
second story was a 945-word translated segment from Paul Coelho’s 
(1993) “The Alchemist,” consisting of a dialogue between an adoles-
cent and an old man about religion, love, and wisdom.
Design and Procedure. There were three sessions, spaced a 
week apart. When individual recollections were called for, the par-
ticipants were placed in separate rooms. We openly audiotaped all 
the individual recollections and group recountings. In Session 1, the 
family members read the stories at their own pace, with the under-
standing that they would later have to discuss them with other family 
members. The order in which the family members read the two sto-
ries was counterbalanced across families. After the family members 
had talked to each other for 20 min about a recent family celebration 
(e.g., a birthday), they individually recalled aloud each of the two 
stories, after each story had been identified by its title. They were 
told to remember the story as accurately as possible and in as much 
detail as possible and were pressed, at the end, to provide assurance 
that they had recalled as much as they could. The stories were re-
called in the order in which they had originally been studied.
In Session 2, the family members were assembled as a group and 
were asked to recount the first story that they had studied, again 
identified by title. The family members were then placed in separate 
rooms and, following the procedure in the first session, were asked 
to recollect individually the second story (the control individual rec-
ollection). One week later, the family members were asked once 
again to recollect individually the two stories.
Coding. We transcribed all the audiotape recordings and then 
checked the accuracy of the transcription against the audiotapes, 
employing an individual naive to the experimental aims. Details can 
be found elsewhere (Hirst & Manier, 1996; Manier, 1997). Suffice it 
to say for the present that, following Dritschel (1991) and Bangerter 
(2000), we first divided the transcribed texts into what we will call 
structural units and then subdivided these into subunits, some of 
which were narrative and some nonnarrative. Narrative units de-
scribe events or states that are linked together (causally, temporally, 
or spatially); that is, they tell the story of a central topic or theme. 
A single narrative unit consists of a subject (perhaps implicit) and a 
predicate, describing a single state, action, or event. It may include 
temporal modifiers and other descriptive phrases but may not de-
scribe an additional state, event, or action (usually signaled by the 
presence of an additional verb). All structural units not fitting this 
definition (e.g., questions and off-topic statements) were coded as 
nonnarrative units.
The next stage of coding involved a series of comparisons, made 
by two independent coders, of narrative units to determine whether 
they “meant the same thing.” The coders were told to score for gist. If 
a narrative unit was “She put the green ball on the table,” the coders 
scored as “meaning the same thing” the phrase “She put the ball on 
the table,” giving it a full point. When an incidental detail was wrong 
but the gist was preserved, as in “She put the red ball on the table,” 
the coders gave the unit half point. The comparisons were among the 
original stories, the pregroup recollections, the group recounting, 
and the postgroup recollections. In all stages and all comparisons, , 
a measure of interrater reliability, was greater than .75 (Fleiss, 1981). 
We asked the two coders to resolve any disagreements.
In order to determine whether a dominant narrator was present 
and, if so, who the dominant narrator was, we first devised a mea-
sure of the extent to which each individual in the group narrated. In 
developing this measure, we kept in mind the possibility that some 
conversational participants who dominated the narrating might also 
utter a large number of nonnarrative utterances, whereas others 
might confine themselves to narrating. Thus, we measured strength 
as narrator as follows:
strength as narrator  [(the proportion of the participant’s nar-
rative units out of the total number of structural units he or she 
contributed)  (the proportion of the participant’s narrative 
units out of all narrative units in the conversation)]/2.
We considered another measure of strength as narrator, which 
focused entirely on the degree to which a participant dominated the 
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narration in the group. The Pearson product–moment correlation be-
tween the two measures was r  .92, p  .001. Moreover, when we 
substituted the one- for the two-dimensional measure in the analyses 
below, the results did not differ. We will focus the discussion here on 
the two-dimensional measure.
After developing a measure of a group member’s strength as nar-
rator, we then sought to determine whether a dominant narrator was 
present in the group recounting. Here, we contrasted the highest 
strength-as-narrator with the average strength-as-narrator scores of 
the other family members, to obtain what we will refer to as mean 
strength as narrator (MSN)—that is, MSN  (strength of individual 
with highest strength as narrator)  (average of strength as narrator 
of all other family members).
Although this measure appropriately treats the group members’ 
dominance as narrators as a matter of degree, we also made a qual-
itative classification of groups as possessing or not possessing a 
dominant narrator. We categorized the 24 families we tested as to 
whether they belonged to either a high-MSN group (above the me-
dian MSN score) or a low-MSN group (below the median). As we 
will use the term in this article, a dominant narrator is present in the 
high-MSN groups and absent in the low-MSN groups.
Measure of centrality. We asked 18 Romanian students enrolled 
at Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania, who were naive to the 
study, to specify for each idea unit of the story whether it was “core 
or central to the story.” For each story, they first read it in its entirety 
and then rated each idea unit on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 indicat-
ing that the unit was extremely peripheral to the story and 10 that it 
was extremely core or central to the story. The order of the stories 
was counterbalanced across raters. For each idea unit, we averaged 
over the raters’ responses and treated this average as the centrality 
score of the idea unit.
Results
In what follows, we first will discuss the pregroup in-
dividual recollections, then the group recountings (and 
the control individual recountings), and finally the post-
group individual recollections. In many of the analyses, 
we are comparing the performance of groups across con-
ditions; however, in some instances, we are interested in 
the performance of individuals within the group. In the 
latter instances, performance scores may not be indepen-
dent of each other, thereby undermining a key assump-
tion underlying ANOVAs. Because of this concern, Kashy 
and Kenny (2000) have suggested that researchers should 
examine intraclass correlations to determine whether in-
terdependency exists and, if it does, to account for this 
interdependency in the statistical analysis. According to 
this method, if a significant level of intraclass correla-
tion is found for the scores, groups, instead of individu-
als, should be treated as the units of analysis. In testing 
the significance of an intraclass correlation, we adopted 
a liberal criterion ((  .2), following Kashy and Kenny’s 
recommendation. (We will report results from the intra-
class correlations analyses only when they indicated that 
we should treat individuals as the units of analysis, since 
the default is to treat groups as the unit.)
Pregroup individual recollections. Pregroup indi-
vidual recollections consisted, on the average, of 292.1 
words and 37.8 narrative units. The participants told sub-
stantially different stories in the pregroup recollections, 
when the details are considered. Family members recalled 
an average of 18% of the narrative units in the original 
stories. Averaging over families and stories, we found that 
56% of the total number of distinct narrative units in all 
pregroup recollections were found in only one of the pre-
group recollections, 24% in two, 16% in three, and only 
4% in all four recollections.
As was expected, shared narrative units were more 
core, or central, than were unshared narrative units. Using 
the centrality ratings as the dependent measure, we found 
a main effect for the degree of sharedness [F(1,23)  
29.88, MSe  11.6, p  .001]. Recollections shared by 4 
family members had an average centrality rating of 6.61; 
by 3 family members, 5.94; by 2 family members, 5.63; 
and by only 1 family member, 5.68.
Group recounting. In 17 groups, 1 and only 1 person 
in a conversation had a strength-as-narrator score of .25 
or better. In the other 7 groups, 2 family members scored 
.25 or better. All but 2 of the participants in the present 
study had a strength-as-narrator score greater than 0, in-
dicating that almost everyone narrated, at least to a small 
extent. We did not find either gender or family role (parent 
vs. child) to be a good predictor of conversational roles; 
dominant narrators included sons, daughters, mothers, 
and fathers.
As to the MSN scores, the strength-as-narrator score 
of the strongest narrator in the high-MSN groups was, 
on average, .38, with scores ranging from .27 to .71. The 
strength-as-narrator score of the strongest narrator in the 
low-MSN groups was, on average, .20, with scores rang-
ing from .14 to .27.
We predicted that the proportion of unshared pregroup 
narrative units emerging in the group recounting should 
be greater in the high-MSN groups than in the low-MSN 
groups and that these unshared pregroup narrative units 
should be mainly those of the dominant narrator. To test 
these predictions, we calculated, for each family member, 
his or her proportion of unshared pregroup narrative units 
in the group recounting out of the total number of narra-
tive units in the group recounting (see Table 1). Using this 
measure, a significant interaction between the size of the 
MSN of a group (low vs. high MSN) and the role of the 
family member in the group (strongest narrator vs. oth-
ers) emerged [F(1,22)  7.99, MSe  0.01, p  .01]. As 
for shared pregroup narrative units, the size of the MSN 
did not matter.
Postgroup individual recollections. We were inter-
ested in whether conversational remembering promotes 
the formation of a collective memory. To test this, we 
Table 1 
Distribution of Narrative Units in the Group Recounting: 
Proportions of Unshared and Shared Pregroup Narrative Units 
Emerging in the Group Recounting Out of the Total Narrative 
Units in the Group Recounting
Unshared Pregroup
Recollections From Shared Pregroup
Group  Strongest Narrator  Others  Recollections
Low MSN .14 .08 .68
High MSN .22  .08  .69
Note—MSN, mean strength as narrator.
756    CUC, OZURU, MANIER, AND HIRST
used a version of the definition developed in the intro-
duction—namely, that a collective memory is formed if 
the overlap of postgroup recollections is greater than the 
overlap of pregroup recollections. We defined overlap as 
the number of narrative units shared across the recollec-
tions of 4, 3, or 2 members divided by the total number 
of semantically distinct narrative units in all four recol-
lections (see Table 2). (Although our design is quasi- 
experimental, we retain the standard convention of refer-
ring to the conditions as experimental vs. control, with ex-
perimental referring to the condition of group recounting 
and control referring to the individual recollection condi-
tion.) We found main effects for condition [experimental 
vs. control; F(1,23)  4.37, MSe  0.05, p  .05] and 
time [pregroup vs. postgroup; F(1,23)  10.05, MSe  
0.07, p  .01]. More important, we found an interaction 
between condition and time [F(1,23)  29.96, MSe  
0.11, p  .001]. This interaction suggests that a collective 
memory is more likely to emerge after a group recounting 
than after control individual recollections. Another way of 
stating this is that the recollections of the participants in 
group recountings lost their individualistic character from 
pregroup to postgroup.
One cannot determine from these overlap measures 
whether unshared pregroup recollections are, indeed, 
being transformed into shared postgroup recollections. 
The unshared recollections may simply be forgotten. In 
order to determine what happened to the unshared pre-
group recollections, we traced them from pregroup to 
postgroup. We first calculated the proportion of a family 
member’s unshared pregroup narrative units that emerged 
in his or her postgroup individual recollection (self-to-self 
transmission of narrative units). We then calculated the 
proportion of this individual’s unshared pregroup recollec-
tions that emerged in the postgroup recollection of any of 
the other 3 family members (self-to-others transmission).
Intuitively, we might expect that any group member 
would be more likely to get a narrative unit from his or 
her pregroup recollections into his or her own postgroup 
recollection (self-to-self ) than into other group members’ 
postgroup recollections (self-to-others). We observed this 
pattern in the control condition. On average, 47% of the 
narrative units in a group member’s unshared pregroup 
recollections overlapped with those in his or her own post-
group recollections, whereas only 12% of his or her un-
shared pregroup narrative units could be found in another 
group member’s postgroup recollections [t(23)  7.74, 
p  .001].
The more interesting data came from the experimental 
condition (see Table 3). We expected that the difference 
between the self-to-self score and the self-to-others score 
should be smaller for the strongest narrator in a family 
than for the other family members. Moreover, we expected 
that this effect should be greater for the high-MSN groups 
than for the low-MSN groups. Or to put it another way, 
there should be a three-way interaction among conversa-
tional role (strongest narrator vs. others), MSN (high vs. 
low), and type of score (self-to-self vs. self-to-other). In 
an ANOVA, we found the predicted three-way interaction 
[F(1,22)  8.49, MSe  0.26, p  .008]. Thus, dominant 
narrators were more likely than other family members to 
get their unshared pregroup recollections into others’ post-
group recollections. Moreover, this advantage was greater 
to the extent that the dominant narrator was a member of 
a high-MSN group.
As to the content of the postgroup collective memories, 
first, we predicted that the postgroup collective memory 
should be more likely to consist of core and central ele-
ments for low-MSN groups than for high-MSN groups. 
In other words, low-MSN groups should have a larger 
measure of centrality than do high-MSN groups. If we 
define the postgroup collective memory conservatively 
as consisting of those recollections shared by 3 or 4 group 
members, we find that the average centrality rating for 
the postgroup collective memories was 6.00 for the high-
MSN groups and 6.38 for the low-MSN groups [t(22)  
2.25, p  .05].
Second, we predicted that when a dominant narrator 
was present, the postgroup collective memory should 
resemble the dominant narrator’s, with this resemblance 
being stronger for high-MSN groups than for low-MSN 
groups. We examined the overlap of the dominant nar-
rator’s recollection with the recollections of other family 
members (narrator/other overlap), as well as the over-
lap across the recollections of nonnarrators (other/other 
overlap). We define overlap here as the number of items 
two individuals have in common divided by the total num-
Table 2 
Proportion of Narrative Units Shared by Family Members  
Out of Total Number of Narrative Units
  
Condition
  Pregroup 
Recollection




 Control  .45  .43  
Table 3 
Overlap Between Unshared Pregroup and Postgroup Recollections for 
the Experimental Condition: From Self to Self or From Self to Others
Strongest Narrator Other Family Members
Group  Self to Self  Self to Others  Self to Self  Self to Others
Low MSN .50 .19 .42 .16
High MSN .43  .45  .46  .12
Note—MSN, mean strength as narrator.
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ber of semantically distinct narrative units uttered by the 
two group members. The narrator/other overlap was the 
average of the strongest narrator’s overlap with each of 
the 3 other family members. The other/other overlap was 
the average of all possible pairings of the 3 other fam-
ily members (see Figure 1). The difference between the 
narrator/other overlap and the other/other overlap should 
be greater for postgroup recollections than for pregroup 
recollections in the experimental condition, particularly 
as a function of the type of MSN group. We found the 
expected significant three-way interaction between type 
of overlap (narrator/other vs. other/other), condition (pre-
group vs. postgroup), and MSN (high vs. low) [F(1,22)  
5.08, MSe  0.03, p  .05].
Discussion
The present results indicate that conversations can pro-
mote the formation of a collective memory but that this in-
fluence is associated with the presence of a dominant nar-
rator. Even though group recountings often do not include 
unshared pregroup recollections (Wittenbaum & Park, 
2001), Study 1 showed that unshared pregroup recollec-
tions are likely to emerge in the group recounting to the 
extent that dominant narrators are present. The influence 
narrators have on the group recounting also shapes the 
content of postgroup collective memories. To the degree 
that dominant narrators are present, postgroup collective 
memories reflect their unique rendering of the past. To the 
degree that they are absent, they consist mainly of core 
and central elements.
We found no evidence that the postgroup collective 
memory was likely to be the sum of the individual pre-
group recollections: Only 26.4% of the pregroup indi-
vidual narrative units found their way into the postgroup 
collective memory. What about blendings? We did not 
directly probe for their presence, because it would have 
been challenging to determine the wide variety of pos-
sible blendings of the narrative elements of the original 
story. However, only 7% of the narrative units in the post-
group recollections failed to capture the gist of any of the 
narrative units in the pregroup recollections. This figure 
places an upper limit on the number of blendings in the 
postgroup recollections and suggests that there were few 
blendings in the postgroup collective memories that we 
collected. (The figure also indicates that few distortions 
were introduced into recollections through the group re-
counting process.) We might have found more blending if 
our material had allowed for graded responses (cf. Sherif, 
1966; Wilkes-Gibbs & Kim, 1991). However, it is worth not-
ing that blendings have been shown to be difficult to detect 
in the postevent information literature (e.g., Belli, 1988).
Finally, it is possible that one member’s unshared pre-
group recollections emerged in other members’ postgroup 
recollections as a result of reminiscence. This possibility 
seems unlikely, in that in the control condition, the partici-
pants recalled as many narrative units in their postgroup 
recollection (M  153.2, SD  52.1) as in their pregroup 
recollection (M  148.6, SD  45.3). Moreover, if we 
calculate the other/other overlap score, as outlined above, 
for the control condition, we do not find a significant dif-
Figure 1. The difference between the other/other overlap scores and the narrator/
other overlap scores for the pregroup and postgroup recollections in the experimental 
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ference (pregroup other/other overlap, M  .08, SD  
.08; postgroup other/other overlap, M  .08, SD  .06).
STUDY 2
We sought to confirm the results of Study 1 by employ-
ing not only a postgroup free recall test, but also a post-
group recognition test. Moreover, we wanted to explore 
whether the effects we had observed extended to groups of 
unrelated individuals. Finally, we were concerned that the 
transformation of unshared pregroup recollections into 
shared postgroup recollections might have arisen not only 
because an item in the group recounting reminded the par-
ticipants of a forgotten item, but also because of social 
contagion (cf. Basden et al., 2000). Consequently, we now 
asked unrelated participants to read stories with different 
versions of several details. For instance, in a story about 
an extramarital affair, the participants read that a couple 
met in a café, bar, Italian restaurant, or steakhouse, de-
pending on which version of the story they were given. A 
recognition probe would consist of the version of one of 
the set of these contrasting details—for example, “Did the 
couple meet in (a) a café, (b) a bar, (c) an Italian restau-
rant, or (d) a steakhouse?” We were chiefly interested in 
whether recognition errors (false alarms) could be traced 
back to the conversation.
Method
Participants. Twenty male and 36 female English-speaking 
adults, recruited by a flyer posted around the New School Univer-
sity campus, were divided into groups whose members did not know 
each other. The participants were paid for their efforts.
Stimulus Materials. We constructed four short stories, with an 
average length of 438.3 words (range: 275–794 words). For each 
story, we devised four different versions by changing story details. 
The stories were paired, with each pair of stories consisting of 
one story with four critical details and one story with six critical 
details.
For the recognition task, we devised a questionnaire booklet with 
a four-item forced choice recognition probe printed on each letter-
size page. Each probe consisted of a brief question about a detail in 
the story, followed by four possible answers. For the 20 probes as-
sessing the 20 sets of contrasting details, the probe consisted of the 
four different versions that the participants had read. For the 20 four-
choice recognition probes assessing noncontrasting details, the foils 
were constructed to be reasonable alternatives to the target item.
Design and Procedure. The procedure was similar to that in 
Study 1. In order to ensure that the results from Study 1 did not de-
pend on the retention intervals we used, we shortened them here. At 
the beginning of the experiment, in separate rooms, each participant 
read the four short stories for 20 min and then, as distraction, filled 
out a personality questionnaire for 20 min; finally, he or she recalled 
individually all four stories. The next day, group members were intro-
duced to each other and were instructed to get to know each other for 
15 min. After this warm-up period, they recalled two of the stories as 
a group. Afterward, they were ushered into separate rooms and were 
asked to recall individually the remaining two stories, one story at a 
time. The sequence (group recounting vs. control individual recol-
lection) was counterbalanced, as was the assignment of the stories to 
the group recounting and individual recall conditions. A 20-min dis-
traction task consisting of crypt-arithmetic problems followed. The 
participants then free-recalled all four stories. The recognition test 
was administered immediately after the individual free recall task. 
In the recognition test, the participants were instructed to choose the 
item that they remembered from the text and to assign a confidence 
rating to each of their responses. We stressed that we wanted them to 
respond accurately with what was in the original text.
Results
There are four main results to be reported: (1) recog-
nition memory, (2) confidence ratings, (3) individual 
free recall, and (4) the consensus among the postgroup 
individual recollections. The data of 2 participants were 
eliminated because these individuals had participated in a 
similar study.
Recognition. We transcribed the pregroup and post-
group recollections, as well as the group recounting, and 
then identified the presence of a contrasting detail in the 
transcript. The version in the group recounting had to be 
exactly as stated in the original story to count as a restate-
ment of the original. Thus, if a participant said that the 
couple had met at a restaurant, it did not count as cor-
rect for a statement that the couple had met in an Italian 
restaurant. Two coders undertook this task, with a reli-
ability measure of   .83. On average, 72% of at least 
one version of the critical details surfaced in the group 
recountings.
We confined the present analysis to those recognition 
probes made up of contrasting details, classifying the re-
sponses to the probes as hits, critical false alarms (partici-
pants falsely recognized a distractor that could be traced to 
the conversation), and random false alarms (participants 
falsely recognized a distractor that had no known source). 
We calculated a base rate in order to control for the pos-
sibility that more than one version of a contrasting detail 
appeared in the group recounting:
base rate  (1.0  experimental hit rate)  average 
 number of alternative versions of a 
 critical item emerging in the group/3.
There were two relevant comparisons: (1) between hits 
in the experimental and control conditions and (2) be-
tween critical false alarms and base rates (see Table 4). We 
Table 4 
Recognition Performance and Confidence Ratings
Recognition Confidence
Measure  M  SD  M  SD
Experimental Condition
Hits .74 .22 5.24 0.86
Critical false alarms .21 .23 4.26 1.06
Random false alarms .05 .08 3.06 1.54
Base rate .14 .13 –
Mean no. of versions selected 3.07 0.45 –
Control Condition
Hits .82 .16 5.32 0.68
Random false alarms .18 .03 3.34 1.33
Mean no. of versions selected  3.43  0.25 –   
Note—The means for Experiment 4 were adjusted to exclude instances 
in which the participants failed to respond within 5 sec, an average of 
6% of the trials.
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treated individuals as the unit of analysis when compar-
ing hit rates. Intraclass correlations between experimental 
and control hits were not significant for the group main 
effect [F(13,40)  1.14, MSe  459.56, p  .3] or for the 
group  treatment interaction [F(13,40)  1.27, MSe  
250.64, p  .2]. Paired sample t tests established that the 
difference between experimental hits and control hits was 
significant [t(53)  2.48, p  .05]. For the comparison 
between critical false alarms and the base rate, the unit 
of analysis was groups. The rate of critical false alarms 
was reliably above the base rate [t(13)  2.04, p  .05]. 
Although other explanations are possible, these results are 
consistent with those dealing with social contagion (e.g., 
Meade & Roediger, 2002): False alarms were more likely 
to increase following group recounting than following in-
dividual recounting. Moreover, the false recognitions were 
traced to what had been said in the group recounting.
Confidence ratings. We compared the confidence rat-
ings assigned to incidences of hits, critical false alarms, 
and random false alarms (see Table 4). None of the intra-
class correlations was significant at the .20 level, indicat-
ing that individual participants could be treated as the unit 
of analysis. A comparison of means revealed significant 
differences between confidence ratings for hits and false 
alarms in the control condition [t(25)  8.92, p  .01], 
for hits and random false alarms in the experimental con-
dition [t(25)  7.45, p  .01], and for critical false alarms 
and random false alarms in the experimental condition 
[t(14)  3.04, p  .01]. The difference between confi-
dence ratings for experimental hits and critical false rec-
ognitions was only marginally significant [t(28)  2.05, 
p  .06]. The presence of a contrasting item in the group 
recounting not only led to more false alarms in the post-
group recognition test, but also created greater confidence 
in these false alarms.
Postgroup individual free recall. As with the rec-
ognition measures, the analysis of the individual free 
recall focused on the participants’ memory for contrast-
ing items. We first calculated the proportion of critical 
details recalled (see Table 5). In a two-way ANOVA, we 
found a significant main effect for condition [experimen-
tal vs. control; F(1,13)  5.54, MSe  0.05, p  .05] and 
a marginal main effect of time [pregroup vs. postgroup; 
F(1,13)  4.04, MSe  0.02, p  .06].
More pertinent are the false recalls—that is, recalled 
critical details that were not present in the originally stud-
ied story. For the experimental condition, we classified 
falsely recalled critical items in the postgroup recollec-
tions as critical false recalls if they appeared in the group 
recounting and as random false recalls if they did not. 
For the control condition, we could look only at what we 
have defined as random false recalls. We were interested 
in the proportion of false recalls out of the total number of 
critical details in the original stories (see Table 5). For the 
experimental condition, although the proportion of false 
recalls was small, the proportion of critical false recalls 
was significantly greater than the proportion of random 
false recalls [t(13)  4.56, p  .01].
Mnemonic convergence and conversational roles. 
If postgroup memories converged on a single rendering 
of the past, group members should have recognized (cor-
rectly or incorrectly) fewer versions of a critical detail in 
the experimental condition than in the control condition. 
We determined the average number of versions recognized 
for each critical detail across the 10 critical details. As 
Table 4 indicates, this average was smaller for the experi-
mental condition than for the control condition [t(13)  
2.63, p  .03].
As to the recall performance, for each group, we cal-
culated the number of different versions of a critical item 
across the 4 group members’ recollections, first for the 
pregroup recollections and then for the postgroup recol-
lections. Many of the critical items were never recalled by 
any group member in their pregroup or postgroup recol-
lections, and few of the items emerged in all four of the 
pregroup or postgroup recollections. Hence, the number 
of recalled versions was quite small when averaged across 
the 10 critical items. For the pregroup recollections, the 
average number of versions was .98 in the experimental 
condition and .99 in the control condition; for the post-
group recollections, the average number was .91 in the 
experimental condition and .99 in the control condition. 
A two-way ANOVA revealed significant main effects for 
condition [F(1,13)  20.25, MSe  0.02, p  .01] and 
time [F(1,13)  10.83, MSe  0.002, p  .01] and, im-
portantly, a significant interaction between condition and 
time [F(1,13)  9.03, MSe  0.002, p  .01]. The group 
recounting produced fewer recalled versions in the post-
group recollections than one would expect from the con-
trol condition, indicating that the conversation led to the 
further formation of a collective memory.
What about the contribution of the dominant narrator? 
We followed the procedure outlined in Study 1, using two 
coders. At all stages of the coding,  on the coders’ agree-
ment was .85 or greater. The strongest narrator contrib-
uted a greater proportion of the critical details in the group 
Table 5 
Recall of Critical Items in Pregroup and Postgroup  
Individual Free Recall, Experiment 2
Experimental Control
Pregroup Postgroup Pregroup Postgroup
Measure  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD
Proportion recalled .57 .26 .63 .22 .53 .26 .53 .22
Critical false recall .08 .05
Random false recall  .03  .07  .03  .06  .04  .08  .05  .09
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recounting than one would expect from chance alone [the 
proportion was .70, SD  .10; t(13)  4.67, p  .001]. 
As to the postgroup recollections, a group member was 
more likely to be the source of the critical false alarms as 
his or her strength as narrator increased. The correlation 
between the proportion of critical false alarms attributed 
to what a member recalled in the group recounting and his 
or her strength as narrator was r  .31, p  .05.
These results reinforce those from Study 1. Conversa-
tional remembering promoted the formation of a collec-
tive memory, and critical false recognitions and critical 
false recalls were more likely to have as their source the 
strongest narrator, rather than another group member. 
Moreover, because of the design and material of Study 2, 
the role of social contagion in the formation of collective 
memory is underscored. The pattern of results we found 
is unlikely to be due to guessing or “social conformity” 
(Asch, 1956; Binet, 1900). We stressed that we wanted 
the participants to remember what was in the original ma-
terial. Moreover, in the recognition test, the participants 
placed more confidence in their critical false alarms than 
in their random false alarms.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Conversations do not lead inevitably to the formation of 
a collective memory. At the very least, two criteria in com-
bination are sufficient for a conversation to promote the 
formation of a collective memory: (1) Unshared pregroup 
recollections surface in the conversation, and (2) these 
unshared pregroup recollections “contaminate” the post-
group recollections of other group members. Neither of 
these conditions is satisfied in every act of conversational 
remembering, but when they occur, a collective memory 
will emerge.
Our research indicates that the needed unshared pre-
group recollections will be more likely to surface in a 
group recounting to the degree that a dominant narrator 
is present. Specifically, Study 1 showed that recollections 
were more likely to converge on a shared rendering of the 
past to the extent that the strength of the strongest nar-
rator in a group recounting was markedly greater than 
the strength as narrator of other group members. Study 2 
extended this result not only to recognition, but also to 
groups of unrelated individuals.
If the conversations recorded here are representative of 
everyday conversations, a dominant narrator may surface 
in some, but not all, conversations. Of course, conversa-
tions may still facilitate the formation of a collective mem-
ory even in the absence of a dominant narrator. A shared 
pregroup recollection emerging in the group recounting 
could remind the group of a forgotten pregroup recollec-
tion. Moreover, people may simply forget the unshared 
pregroup recollections in the absence of any rehearsal in 
the group recounting. Interestingly, under this circum-
stance, the result would be a postgroup collective memory 
consisting mainly of shared pregroup recollections (which 
are likely to be core and central story elements), just as we 
found for conversations without a dominant narrator.
In focusing on the contribution of a dominant narra-
tor, we have emphasized the degree to which the narrator 
contributed to the discussion, not the complex social rela-
tionships he or she might have had with other group mem-
bers. In Study 2, we found an effect of narratorship when 
group members were unrelated. As to the social relation-
ships among the family members in Study 1, they may 
have been important in determining which family member 
emerged as a narrator. There probably is, however, no sim-
ple criterion by which one could predict, on the basis of 
these social relationships, who this family member might 
be. As was noted, the dominant narrators in the high-MSN 
groups included fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters (see 
also Hirst et al., 1997). We did find a positive correlation 
between the number of words in an individual’s pregroup 
recollection and his or her strength as narrator (cf. Basden 
et al., 1997). This correlation, however, was a modest .49, 
indicating that the dominant narrator did not always have 
the most extensive pregroup recollection. Elsewhere, we 
have discussed how the personal relevance of a story led a 
group member to adopt the role of dominant narrator; but 
again, this effect of relevance was found in some, but not 
all, of the cases we studied (Hirst & Manier, 1996; Hirst 
et al., 1997; Manier, 1997).
Following Stasser and colleagues (Stasser, et al., 1995; 
Stewart & Stasser, 1995), one might expect that exper-
tise would predict narratorship. In some instances, expert 
status might lead a group member to adopt a dominant 
role. In other instances, however, experts may intention-
ally limit what they contribute to a conversation—for in-
stance, if they are concerned about confidentiality. Even 
if experts are more likely to influence postgroup recollec-
tions than are nonexperts, it does not follow that they will 
necessarily become narrators in group recountings, and 
it will be difficult for them to influence others in a major 
way without playing a major role in the conversations.
In that collective memories held by a group shape the 
identity of the group and, in turn, the actions of the group, 
it is important to understand the conditions under which 
collective memories are likely to be formed. Such an analy-
sis would explore the interaction between cognitive factors 
and situational factors. We have mentioned several possible 
cognitive factors (e.g., in Study 2, the presence of social 
contagion) and one situational factor (the presence of a 
narrator). There are undoubtedly other cognitive and situ-
ational factors. Nevertheless, on the basis of our findings, 
we predict that a collective memory is likely to emerge from 
a conversation if the appropriate cognitive and situational 
factors align. It is not enough for the conditions to be felici-
tous for social contagion, and the presence of a dominant 
narrator will probably not be sufficient if social contagion is 
in some manner inhibited. Neither of these conditions may 
be necessary for the formation of a collective memory, but 
more importantly, neither alone is sufficient. Both domi-
nant narrator and conditions conducive to social contagion 
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must be present if either is to serve as a means through 
which a collective memory is formed.
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